by Michael Rubin, AEI
The Islamic Revolution in Iran ushered in a period of enmity between Iran and Egypt. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Iran’s revolutionary leader, made enmity toward and a firm belief in the illegitimacy of Israel a pillar of the new regime’s ideology. He put Egypt—the only Arab country to recognize Israel—in Iran’s sites. Relations deteriorated further after the 1981 assassination of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat: rather than condemn Sadat’s murder, the Iranian leadership celebrated it, even naming a Tehran street after Khalid Islambouli, Sadat’s assassin. Over the next three decades Iranian leaders regularly belittled Sadat’s successor, Hosni Mubarak, as a “pharaoh,” castigating both his dictatorial ways (Iranian regime rhetoric regularly depicts the Islamic Republic as a democracy) and implying that he belonged to the pre-Islamic world of the jahaliyya, the age of ignorance. Efforts at rapprochement between Iran and the largest Arab country repeatedly fell flat as Iranian hardliners castigated their reformist counterparts’ calls for improved relations with Egypt as a betrayal of both basic Islamic principles and Khomeini’s vision. Mubarak’s fall, however, coupled with the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, led to hopes—at least in Tehran— for a renaissance in relations, if not a new Tehran-Cairo axis.
The Islamic Revolution in Iran ushered in a period of enmity between Iran and Egypt. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Iran’s revolutionary leader, made enmity toward and a firm belief in the illegitimacy of Israel a pillar of the new regime’s ideology. He put Egypt—the only Arab country to recognize Israel—in Iran’s sites. Relations deteriorated further after the 1981 assassination of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat: rather than condemn Sadat’s murder, the Iranian leadership celebrated it, even naming a Tehran street after Khalid Islambouli, Sadat’s assassin. Over the next three decades Iranian leaders regularly belittled Sadat’s successor, Hosni Mubarak, as a “pharaoh,” castigating both his dictatorial ways (Iranian regime rhetoric regularly depicts the Islamic Republic as a democracy) and implying that he belonged to the pre-Islamic world of the jahaliyya, the age of ignorance. Efforts at rapprochement between Iran and the largest Arab country repeatedly fell flat as Iranian hardliners castigated their reformist counterparts’ calls for improved relations with Egypt as a betrayal of both basic Islamic principles and Khomeini’s vision. Mubarak’s fall, however, coupled with the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, led to hopes—at least in Tehran— for a renaissance in relations, if not a new Tehran-Cairo axis.
It is against this backdrop that this short
excerpt from the semiofficial, hardline Fars News Agency, is
interesting. While Tehran and Cairo have yet to re-establish full
diplomatic relations— probably because of objections from Riyadh and
Doha, both of whom are major donors to the faltering Egyptian
economy—the Iranian Interests Section in Cairo is becoming increasingly
more active and taking a far higher profile.
The Iranian encouragement to the Egyptian film
industry is important. Cairo is the Hollywood of the Arab world. From
Tangiers to the Tigris, Arabs watch Egyptian soap operas and full-length
comedies. It is the Egyptian dominance of film that has led to the
Egyptian dialect of Arabic becoming the most widely understood, perhaps
even more so than the stodgy and formal “Modern Standard” dialect taught
at most universities and in diplomatic parlors. Throughout the Mubarak
years, Egyptian cinema has also been political. The Egyptian leadership
used films like “Al-Irhabi” (The Terrorist) and “Al-Irhab wal Kebab”
(Terrorism and Kebab) to satirize and ridicule Islamist groups. Having
taken control, the Muslim Brotherhood sought its own revenge, trying and
sentencing Adel Emam, the star of the films and Egypt’s best known
comedian of the silver screen, to three months in prison for insulting
Islam.